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FOR 


AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION 

OF THE UNITED STATES, 


PROVIDING FOR THU 


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AND GUARDING AGAINST 


THE UNDUE EXERCISE OF EXECUTIVE INFLUENCE, 


PATRONAGE, AND POWER. 

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PROPOSITIONS 

OF 

AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION 

OF THE UNITED STATES. 


Every friend of the United States, wishing their prosperity, 
permanent union, and the quiet enjoyment of the blessings of 
liberty, both individual and national , must, when he reviews the 
history of Presidential elections, feel an anxious solicitude for 
the future. 

The electioneering party strife which has been introduced 
into our Legislative halls, and into the Executive departments 
of our Government, must be alarming to every considerate man, 
and must excite melancholy forebodings as to the final result. 
This party strife is not confined to the General Government, it 
extends to the Legislatures of every State, and descends even 
to town and city corporations. 

These considerations have induced the revisal of a pamphlet, 
containing certain proposed amendments to the Constitution of 
the United States, and the sundry explanatory remarks, which 
exhibit their importance, and the then existing and growing 
necessity of their adoption. The contents of that pamphlet 
were, in 1808 , presented to the Senate of the United States, 
by a Senator of Connecticut, and printed. The evils of party 
strife , growing out of Presidential elections, and the exercise of 
Executive influence, patronage, and power, have, in practice, 
far exceeded what was then predicted ; and, as the United 
States increase in opulence and strength, these evils may be 
expected to increase to the endangering the public welfare. 

If, in the first formation of our Constitution, the substance 
of those amendments had been interwoven into it, it is by no 
means certain it would not have proved most beneficial. But 
the Constitution having now been more than forty years in ope¬ 
ration, it is not deemed expedient to attempt to make amend¬ 
ments which are not of vital importance to the peace and safety 
of the nation. Under that impression, every thing is omitted in 
the amendments now proposed, except what relates to the ap¬ 
pointment of the President and Vice President, and the providing 
a salutary check on that Executive influence and patronage, 
which, during the short time we have existed as a nation, has 



4 


had a constructive extension , found to be both inconvenient and 
injurious. Competent provision ought to be made in the Con 
stitution against its improper exercise; and nothing can be so 
effectual as the adoption of some mode of appointing a Presi¬ 
dent, which shall render it impossible for a candidate to bring 
the prerogatives of the office to his aid in an election, and to 
take away all temptation to use them in any other manner than 
for the public good. Under these impressions, the amendments 
now proposed extend no further than to what relates to the ap¬ 
pointment of the President and Vice President, and to a neces¬ 
sary check on the improper exercise of Executive power and 
influence. As the pamphlet alluded to, contains explanations 
and reasons illustrative of the expediency of adopting the amend¬ 
ments, it is subjoined by way of Appendix. 

More than twenty years having now elapsed since those pro¬ 
positions were presented to the Senate, and as they were not then 
thought to have any party reference, or allusion, so their re¬ 
publication, at this time, cannot be considered as having any 
such allusion ; most assuredly no such reference is intended. 

Were the Author now a Member of Congress, these amend¬ 
ments would be presented to that body in an official form ; but 
that not being the case, and deeming it important, as regards 
the future peace and prosperity of the Union, that measures 
should be adopted to arrest what our wisest and best men con¬ 
sider as a dangerous evil, resort is had to the press, the only 
way left to propose the subject to the People ; who, being the 
source of all power, can speak with effect. 

From persons devoted to party, no aid can be expected; they 
calculate on personal emolument, or advancement, from the 
agitation and changes which may be brought about by party 
exertions in a Presidential Election. The great body of the 
People, however, can feel no interest in having the community 
disturbed by such agitations and contentions. Every day, and 
in every part of this extended Empire, are heard expressions 1 

of regret that such a state of things should exist; to remedy 
it, various projects have been brought forward, but none have 
been assented to that have proved effectual. 

A candid and careful examination of the plan proposed, is 
most earnestly invited. Let not its peculiarity cause it to bo 
thrown aside as visionary axuMdle; it will be found fraught 
with more important results, than a cursory examination would 
perhaps suggest. 

Probably not many more Presidential Elections will pass, 
before the evils growing out of the present mode of appointing 
our Chief Magistrate will appear so great, and so alarming, 
as to cause the adoption of some other method. As the year 


5 


eighteen hundred and thirty-seven is beyond the period for which 
any of the present Senators are elected, should these amend¬ 
ments be adopted, every Senator would thereafter be chosen 
with the express view to his being a candidate for tbe office of 
President ; and we might confidently trust that the States 
would select their ablest men; and, beyond a doubt, every State 
in the Union would have in it men who are competent to the 
office, after six years’ experience in the discharge of Execu¬ 
tive duties, as a Senator of the United States. 


AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES. 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled , two thirds of 
both Houses concurring, That the following articles be pro¬ 
posed to the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States ; all, or any of which 
articles, when ratified by three fourths of the said Legisla¬ 
tures, to be valid to all intents and purposes as part of said 
Constitution, viz : 


ARTICLE I. 

Sec. 1 . On the last Wednesday of February, one thousand 
eight hundred and thirty-seven, and on the last Wednesday of 
February in each succeeding two years, the President shall be 
chosen, to hold his office for two years from and after the third 
day of March then next, to be elected as follows : 

Sec. 2. In presence of the Senate and House of Representa¬ 
tives, each Senator belonging to the class whose term of ser¬ 
vice will first expire, and constitutionally eligible to the office 
of President, of which the House of Representatives shall be 
the sole judges, shall, beginning with tbe first on the alpha¬ 
bet, and in their alphabetical order, draw an ivory ball out of 
a box containing the same number of uniform balls as there 
shall be Senators present and eligible, one of which shall be a 
colored ball, the others white; the Senator who shall draw the 
colored ball, shall be President. A committee of the House 
of Representatives, to consist of one member from each State, 
to be appointed in such manner as the House shall direct, shall 
place the balls in the box, shake the same so as to intermix 
them, and superintend the drawing thereof. 



6 


ARTICLE II. 

Sec. 1 . And thereupon the Vice-President shall be elected 
from the remaining Senators of the same class, to hold his of¬ 
fice for a like term of two years. 

Sec. 2. In case of the removal of the President from office, 
or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the pow¬ 
ers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the 
Vice-President during the remainder of the term : and the 
Congress may, by law, provide for the case of removal, death, 
resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-Presi¬ 
dent, declaring what officer shall act accordingly, until the 
disability be removed, or a President shall be elected. 

ARTICLE III. 

Sec. 1 . In case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, 
both of the President and Vice-President, if Congress be in 
session, if not, as soon as they shall be in session, the Presi¬ 
dent shall, in like manner, be elected for the residue of the 
term, to be taken from the class of Senators whose term of ser¬ 
vice will then first expire. 

ARTICLE IV. 

Sec. 1 . The President shall have power, by and with the 
advice and consent of the Senate, and not otherwise, to remove 
all officers of the United States to whose appointment the ad¬ 
vice and consent of the Senate is made necessary, excepting 
the Judges of the Supreme and inferior Courts. 

Sec. 2. In every case of misconduct in office, the President 
alone shall have power to suspend the officer, and make a tem¬ 
porary appointment of a person to discharge the duties of the 
office, until a decision can be had on the question of removal, 
which decision shall be on the information and reasons com¬ 
municated by the President. 

ARTICLE V. 

Sec. 1 . No Senator or Representative shall, during the term 
for which he was chosen, be appointed to any office of honor, 
trust, or profit, under the United States. 


APPENDIX. 


PROPOSITIONS 


fob 


A M E N D I N G THE CONSTITUTIO N 


OF THIS HNITEB STATES: 


SUBMITTED BY Mn. HILLHOUSE TO THE SENATE, 


ON TKK TWELFTH DAT OF APRIL, 1808 , 


WITH HIS EXPLANATORY REMARKS. 


NEW HAVEN: 


PRINTED BY OLIVER STEELE CO- 

















































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PROPOSITIONS 


FOR 

AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 


Being about to offer a resolution proposing sundry impor¬ 
tant amendments to the Constitution of the United States, 1 
must ask the patience and attention of the Senate to some pre¬ 
liminary remarks, to explain their tendency and object. 

The situation of the United States, at the time of the meet¬ 
ing of the Convention for forming the Constitution, I well re¬ 
member ; and it will be recollected by every member of this 
Senate to have been such as to excite the anxious solicitude of 
every considerate man in our country. External pressure be¬ 
ing removed, the recommendations of Congress had ceased to 
have effect on the States. We were a nation without credit and 
without resources; or rather without the means of drawing them 
forth. Local policy began to operate in a manner that tended 
to excite jealousy and discontent among the States ; and there 
was reason to fear that we were exposed, and at no remote pe¬ 
riod, to all the calamities of civil war. Under these circum¬ 
stances, the present Constitution was promulgated, and was 
eagerly seized on by the great body of the People, as the pal¬ 
ladium of our liberties, and the bond of our union . I was of 
the number of those who approved it, though some parts of it 
appeal’d to me mere theories in the science of government, 
which I hoped in the experiment would prove salutary; but 
my expectations were not sanguine. 

It has been with anxious concern that I have seen a disposi¬ 
tion, and various attempts, to mak e partial amendments to the 
Constitution, which have, in some instances, prevailed. Others 
are in progress. All are aimed at particular detached parts; 
which, without examining or regarding the bearing on other 
parts , like partial alterations in a curious complicated machine, 
may, instead of benefiting, destroy its utility. 

Some gentlemen have expressed their regret for having voted 
for amendments already adopted. Other amendments are on 
your table, and coming from such high authority as to demand 
serious attention. From the alarm and jealousy excited in the 
public mind, there is danger of other partial amendments still 
more injurious. Believing as I do, that amendments, and im- 



10 


portant ones too, are necessary, which materially affect the 
office of President, and the power of the two Houses of Con¬ 
gress, and without which our country will be exposed to incal¬ 
culable evils; under these impressions, and to attempt a radi¬ 
cal cure, I am induced to come forward, at this time, with my 
amendments. 

Before I proceed with my explanatory remarks, I must take 
the liberty of stating, that in using the terms monarchy, aris¬ 
tocracy, or democracy, I do not use them as the cant words of 
party—I use them in their fair genuine sense. The terms Fed¬ 
eralist and Republican, 1 do not use by way of commendation 
or reproach; but merely by way of description, as the first 
names of individuals, to distinguish them from others of the 
same family name. 

Federalists and Republicans never divided upon the elemen¬ 
tary principles of government. There are very few Ameri¬ 
cans, who are not in principle, attached to a free Republican 
Government; though they may differ on minor points, and 
about the best mode of organizing it. Persons attached to 
monarchy or aristocracy are few indeed; they are but as the 
dust in the balance. No one in his sober senses can believe it 
practicable, or politic if practicable, to introduce either. It* 
ever introduced, which God forbid, it must be done at the point 
of the bayonet. 

It is well known that the denominations of the parties, call¬ 
ed Federalists and Republicans, were applied, the former to 
those who supported, the latter to those who opposed the two 
first administrations, formed under the Federal Constitution. 
Those who opposed those administrations, wishing to obtain 
the governing power, and disliking the name of Anti-Fede¬ 
ralists, given to the first opposers of the Constitution, assum¬ 
ed the more popular name of Republicans . It cannot be expect¬ 
ed that a politician, when he has made himself up for a politi¬ 
cal ball or masquerade, will exhibit his true character. Many 
of the most florid speeches are made more with an eye to the 
People, than to the body to which they are addressed. To find 
the true character of man, you must look to his homespun , 
every day dress ; if you do this, will you not find a full propor¬ 
tion of good Republicans, as they are called, who exhibit no 
more of that virtue called humility than their neighbors, and 
who manifest no greater regard for equal rights? The sup¬ 
posed differences are more imaginary than real. Names may, 
and sometimes do, deceive ignorant, uninformed individuals; 
but these names now scarcely do that. 

As the amendments 1 shall propose are not to commence 
their operation until the 4th of March, 18IS, which is beyond 


11 


the term of service of any one now in office, they cannot be 
considered as having any personal application: and I assure 
this Senate, that I do not intend, by any thing I shall say, any 
personal or party allusion. As I am about to tread on delicate 
ground, and do not wish to give offence, I thought it incumbent 
on me to make these explanations. 

Some of the important features of our Constitution were bor¬ 
rowed from a model, which did not very well suit our condition : 
I mean the Constitution and Government of England, a mixed 
monarchy, in which monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy are 
so combined as to form a check on each other. One important 
and indispensable requisite of such a Government is, that the 
two first branches should be hereditary, and that the Monarch 
should be the fountain of honor and source of power. In the 
United States, the People are the source of all power. 

We have not the materials for forming an Executive capable 
of wielding royal prerogatives; nor an aristocratic Senate, 
which could form a barrier between tbe exercise of such pre¬ 
rogatives and the spirit of democracy. The President and 
Senate depending for office on a popular election, are constrain¬ 
ed to regard popular opinion. The idea of insuring an ener¬ 
getic and fair administration of the Government, by increas¬ 
ing patronage, and accumulating power and prerogatives in the 
hands of the President is visionary. 

Two evils to be guarded against in a Republican Govern¬ 
ment, (such as is that of the United States, and such as I hope 
and trust it ever will be,) are ambition and favoritism . The 
former induces the most aspiring, artful, and unprincipled men 
to assume the garb of patriotism, for the purpose of obtaining 
office and power: and when they have obtained it, they ex¬ 
tend their patronage and favor to those who have been most 
active and instrumental in procuring their elevation. 

There is no position more generally admitted to be true, than 
that man is fond of power. When ambition is alive, and 
competitors for office take the field, those means which promise 
success will be resorted to. None are more powerful, or can 
be used to greater effect, than the gift of lucrative and impor¬ 
tant offices; and none will be more zealous and indefatigable 
in their exertions than expectants of such offices. A golden 
eagle will bribe but one man; but an office may operate as a 
bribe to one hundred expectants. A man who would spurn at 
a direct offer of money, may be induced to believe he may ac¬ 
cept an office without dishonor. To an ambitious man, how 
great must be the self-denial, that would not permit him to use 
such powerful means to obtain an election, which alone can 
raise him to the most dignified office in the nation. 


12 


Placing in the hands of the Chief Magistrate who depends 
on a popular election, prerogatives and powers in many respects 
equal, in some exceeding in practice, those exercised by the 
King of Great Britain, is one of the errors of the Constitu¬ 
tion. This error can be corrected only in one of two ways ; 
either the otlice must he stripped of those high prerogatives and 
powers, and the term of holding the office shortened; or some 
other mode devised, than a popular election, for appointing a 
President: otherwise our country must perpetually groan un¬ 
der the scourge of party rage and violence, and be continually 
exposed to that worst of all calamities, civil war. 

The President of the United States is commander in chief 
of the Army and Navy; and, when called into actual service, 
of all the militia of the nation. He has the sole power of 
nominating to offices; and exercises the power at his will and 
pleasure, of removing from office. He has a qualified nega¬ 
tive on all laws. He has the sole power of directing the di¬ 
plomatic intercourse with foreign nations, and of forming trea¬ 
ties ; which, though he cannot ratify, he may reject, without 
the approbation of the Senate. He has the power, not of de¬ 
claring war in form, but of adopting a course of measures, 
which will necessarily and inevitably lead to war. He has 
the power of granting pardon for all offences against the Unit¬ 
ed States, except in cases of impeachment. He is entrusted 
with the execution of ali laws, and grants commissions to all 
officers. These are some of the powers and prerogatives vest¬ 
ed by the Constitution in the President; others will be found 
by a careful perusal of it. Can these great powers and high 
prerogatives be more safely trusted in the hands of the Presi¬ 
dent, who may be an aspiring man, and may have friends and 
favorites about him, anxious for office, than with the immedi¬ 
ate representatives of the People, and the Senate representing 
the sovereignty of the States ? 

1 may be told, and 1 admit, that it is easier to point out de¬ 
fects in the Constitution, than to propose remedies: on this 
point I feel the difficulty; I feel great diffidence. The magni¬ 
tude of the subject presents to my mind embarrassments hard 
to be surmounted; and nothing could have induced me to ha¬ 
zard my amendments, but a sense of duty enjoined by my of¬ 
ficial situation, and a distressing apprehension of the danger 
to which we are exposed. I shall not shrink from the task of 
proposing a remedy, and attempting to avert the impending 
danger. 

I am aware I have engaged in a difficult undertaking. I 
have to oppose deep-rooted prejudices and long established 
opinions, which will be abandoned with reluctance. I have 


id 


to contradict favorite theories, long ago adopted, and still stre¬ 
nuously maintained. It is therefore to be expected that argu¬ 
ments, which go to destroy the former, or contradict the lat¬ 
ter, will be admitted with caution, and listened to with a re¬ 
luctant ear. Some of the amendments, when first presented 
to my mind, made but a slight impression, and I was disposed 
to pass them by as impracticable or ineffectual: but experience 
and mature reflection have satisfied me both of their correct¬ 
ness and importance. 

I am aware that the amendments will not be approved by 
many individuals in this nation, under an apprehension of their 
tending to lower the tone and energy of the government. They 
^ will be denounced by all office hunters, demagogues , and men of 

inordinate ambition ;, more anxious for their own elevation to 
office than for the public good. All artful men , who rely more 
on their dexterity and skill in intrigue, than upon honest merit, 
to secure an election, will raise their voices, and cry aloud 
against them. They will describe them as Utopian and vision¬ 
ary ; as departing from the elective principle ; and as lowering 
the dignity and character of the government. But the great 
body of the people, who compose that portion of the community, 
which can have no views of interests incompatible with the 
f general welfare , which can have no other wish or desire than 
to see the nation prosper , and which the feelings of nature 
would stimulate to do what would advance the prosperity and 
happiness of future generations, will, 1 flatter myself, lend a 
listening ear, and grant me a candid and patient hearing. I 
must also be permitted to indulge the hope, that in this honora¬ 
ble body, the amendments will not be hastily rejected; nor 
until they shall have undergone an attentive and critical 
examination. 

A prominent feature of the amendments is, to shorten the 
terms of service of the President, Senators, and Representa- 
1 lives; observation and experience having convinced me, that 
in an elective government, long terms of office and high com¬ 
pensations, do not tend to make independent public servants, 
while they produce an anxious solicitude in the incumbents to 
keep their places; and render seekers of office more eager to 
obtain them, and more regardless of the means. 

It is a souud position, that in a republican government like 
ours, the public will , that is, the sentiment of the majority, 
when fairly and fully ascertained, should prevail: it will, in 
in most cases, comport with the public good. Opinions pro¬ 
duced by a sudden impulse of passion, by a feverish unnatural 
excitement, or by the intrigues of artful designing men, arc 
those against which it is necessary to provide. The idea of 


14 


tying up the hands of the people, who in fact possess the whole 
power, to prevent the execution of that public willy is chimerical; 
there are no cords strong enough to hold them. The most ef¬ 
fectual, and indeed the only effectual guard, against popular 
passion and jealousy, is to let the people see clearly and dis¬ 
tinctly, that there always exists an opportunity for a fair ex¬ 
pression and execution of the public will , and that they are in 
no danger from abuse of power ; seeing their public functiona¬ 
ries are obliged frequently to resort to them for a renewal of 
their authority to exercise their power. No man’s jealousy or 
fears can be excited respecting the exercise of a power, which 
he clearly sees to be subject to his own control. What excites 
alarm among the people is, an accumulation of power in the 
hands of an individual, or of a small body of men, which, 
added to long duration in office, and high salaries, they believe 
may endanger their liberties. To this poison frequent elec¬ 
tions are a complete antidote. Here the people see and under¬ 
stand, that there is perfect security; and when an attempt is 
made to excite their fears or alarm their jealousy, they will 
ask, what possible danger can there be ? have we not the pow¬ 
er in our own hands ? and must not these public functionaries, 
at short intervals, resort to us for power to act at all ? A po¬ 
pular flame cannot be kept alive where there is no fuel to feed it. 

My first amendment goes to reduce the term of service of 
the members of the House of Representatives to one year. 
(See Article I.) 

No inconvenience can arise from this arrangement; because 
there is a constitutional provision that Congress shall assemble 
once in every year. That body, composed of the immediate 
representatives of the People, ought to exhibit a fair repre¬ 
sentation of their sentiments and will ; and coming fresh from 
the People to the Congress of each year, will, it may be pre¬ 
sumed, fairly express such sentiments an,d will . And if, in an 
interval from one session of Congress to another, there be a 
real change of public sentiment, why should not that change be 
expressed ? Will an attempt in their Representatives to re¬ 
sist it, tend to tranquillize the public mind ? or will it not, like 
persecution in religion, tend to make proselytes to their senti¬ 
ments ? Constitutions, except so far as they are necessary to 
organize the several departments of Government, and bring 
the public functionaries into a situation to deliberate and act; 
and in the General Government to draw the line of demarca¬ 
tion between that and the State governments to prevent inter¬ 
ference and collision, are of little avail; and present but feeble 
barriers against the public will. Whenever a measure is un¬ 
derstood and believed to be necessary to promote the general 


15 


welfare, the people will not fail to effect it. If they cannot, by 
construction, get round the Constitution, they will, by an 
amendment, go directly to their object. Of the truth of this, 
experience has furnished ample proof. The danger is, that by 
attempting to extend constitutional restrictions too far, un¬ 
natural and mischievous exertions of power may be produced. 

By the second amendment, the term of service of the Sena¬ 
tors is to be reduced to three years; one third to be chosen 
each year. (See Article II.) 

The Senate, I am aware, may be surprised, and perhaps 
feel some displeasure, that one of their own body should pro¬ 
pose an amendment, which, in the estimation of some, may 
tend to lessen their dignity, and destroy their independence. 
Did I believe this, I should be the last to offer it. If the Se¬ 
nate will hear me patiently, I think I can show that it will 
produce no such effect. 

In the affairs of Government, theories are more deceptive 
than in any other of our concerns. Matters of fact and expe¬ 
rience alone can be safely relied on. That the six years’ term 
of service of Senators does not tend to permanency, the two 
Houses of Congress furnish a striking example. In the Se¬ 
nate greater changes have taken place than in the other 
House, in which I see many members with whom I had the 
honor to serve, previous to my being elected Senator. In this 
body there is not a single person who was a member when 
I first took my seat; and but one who had before been a mem¬ 
ber. Half the present Senate have been taken from the House 
of Representatives; w here, from having been submitted to 
the frequent choice of the People, they had acquired their con¬ 
fidence. The same observation holds good also in State legis¬ 
latures; where the shorter the term of service, the more uni¬ 
formly and steadily have the same members been returned. 
In defiance of all theories , this is the fact. To me the reason 
is obvious. The oftener a Representative is returned to his 
constituents, and is by them re-elected, the obligation of duty 
on his part is increased, and their confidence strengthened. As 
in private life, a frequent interchange of kind offices begets 
attachment and friendship. The shorter the term of service, 
the less the inducement to individual exertion to obtain the 
place ; and the people will be left to a more free and uninflu¬ 
enced exercise of the right of suffrage. It is an axiom not 
to be questioned, that the People, left to a free, unbiassed 
exercise of the right of suffrage, will in most instances, make 
a judicious and wise choice. They can have no interest or in¬ 
ducement to do otherwise. When they have found a good man, 
capable and faithful , they will, if left to themselves, be inclined 


16 


to continue him in the public service, so long as he shall con- 
tinue to be capable and faithful. 

Senators represent the rights and interests of States in re¬ 
spect to their sovereignty. In them, therefore, the States ought 
to feel a confidence. And this confidence will rather be in¬ 
creased than lessened by shortening the term of service to 
three years. Shall I be told that the Legislatures of the 
States are not to be relied on for their stability and patriotism ? 
that it would be unsafe, every third year to trust them with 
the appointment of their Senators ? No, surely. The several 
States are the pillars on which the Constitution of the United 
States rests , and must rest. If these pillars are not sound, 
if they are composed of feeble, frail materials, then must 
the General Government moulder into ruin. This however, 
is not my belief. I have confidence in the State Governments. 
I am for keeping them in their full vigor and strength. For 
if any disaster befals the General Government, the States, 
having within their respective spheres, all the power of inde¬ 
pendent Governments, will be the arks of safety, to which the 
citizens can flee for protection from anarchy , and the horrid 
evils which follow in its train. I have therefore uniformly 
been opposed to measures, which had the remotest tendency to 
their consolidation. 

When I shall have stated the next amendment, it will be found 
that my plan, instead of lessening the dignity and importance 
of Senators, will magnify their office, and make it the object 
of desire aud laudable ambition to the best characters and 
greatest talents of our country : for, from the Senate, I pro¬ 
pose that the President of the United States shall always be 
taken ; and in a manner that will exclude all cabal and undue 
influence in obtaining that high office—a mode in which the 
man of modest merit shall have an equal chance of success 
with the most daring and artful intriguer. 

The third amendment provides for the appointment of a 
President. He is to be taken by lot from the Senate, and is to 
hold his office for one year. (See Article III.) 

This mode promises many advantages, and only two objec¬ 
tions against it present themselves to my mind ; one, that it is 
a departure from the elective principle; the other, that it will 
not always insure the best talents. I should not have proposed 
this mode, if any other could have been devised, which would 
not convulse the whole body politic, set wide open the door to 
intrigue and cabal, and bring upon the nation incalculable evils ; 
evils already felt, and growing more and more serious. Upon 
mature examination, those objections appear less formidable 
than at first view. 


17 


When Senators shall be chosen with an eye to this provision, 
every State will be anxious to make such a selection of persons 
as will not disgrace it in the eventual elevation of one of them 
to the Presidential chair. Every State Legislature would, in 
the choice of a Senator, consider itself as nominating a candi¬ 
date for the Presidency. The effect of this arrangement would 
be, in reality, that instead of the States appointing Electors 
to choose a President, the Legislatures themselves would be¬ 
come the Electors; with this advantage, that the nomination 
would be made when not under the influence of a Presidential 
electioneering fever. In the regular course of appointing 
Senators, only one nomination would be made at one time, in 
each State ; and in most cases, three years would elapse before 
be could be designated for the Presidency. The great caution 
in the selection of Senators, with a reference to that high 
office, w r ould produce another excellent effect ; it would ensure 
the continuance, in that body, of men of the most respectable 
talents and character : an object of the highest importance to 
the general welfare. In the mode directed by the Constitution 
for choosing a President by the House of Representatives, 
there is almost as great a departure, as in what I propose, from 
the pure elective principle; which requires perfect freedom of 
choice among all who are eligible ; and that the ballot of each 
qualified voter shall have equal weight in making such choice . 
Whereas, by the Constitution, the House are confined to three 
candidates, and must vote by States ; so that a State having 
twenty-two members, has but one vote ; and consequently, no 
more weight than a State having only a single member. And 
those States whose members shall be equally divided, will have 
no vote. These circumstances considered, the present consti¬ 
tutional mode of choosing a President by the House of Repre¬ 
sentatives, when tested by the pure elective principle , may be 
deemed, as to the mode of choosing, and the object of the 
choice, as exceptionable as the appointment by lot; while it 
remains liable to all the evils of a contested election, from 
which the appointment by lot is wholly free. 

In answer to the second objection, it may be fairly presumed, 
that the Senate will always be composed of men possessed at 
least of decent talents. And such men, with honest views, 
long experience, and the aid of the heads of departments and 
other officers, would be able to do the public business cor¬ 
rectly. It is not necessary, it is not desirable, that the Pres¬ 
ident should command the armies in person ; and all our for¬ 
eign relations may be managed through the agency of able 
ministers, whose appointments are to be approved both by the 
Senate and House of Representatives. The several execu- 
2 


18 


^ives ever since the adoption of the Constitution, have been in' 
the habit of calling to their aid a cabinet council, composed ol 
the heads of departments ; who ought to consist, as they pro* 
bably will, of men of talents, integrity and experience; and who,, 
upon the plan proposed, being likely to continue long in office* 
will thereby give stability and system to the measures of Go* 
vernment. 

The affairs of almost all Governments have been managed by 
ministers subordinate to thechief magistrate. To this rule Alex¬ 
ander the Great, of ancient times, and of late the great Fred¬ 
erick of Prussia, and the Emperor Napoleon, furnish exceptions. 

Here let me ask, have the rights of individuals, or the liber¬ 
ties of mankind been more safe, or have public affairs been 
conducted in a manner more promotive of the happiness of the 
people, when such mighty Monarchs have swayed the sceptre* 
than when the chief magistrate has possessed only moderate 
talents ? Let history and our own observation decide. 

If the appointment by lot will not always ensure a Presi¬ 
dent of the first rate talents, neither will the present mode of 
electing : for when party spirit runs high, and parties ar& 
nearly balanced, candidates will be set up, not for their ta¬ 
lents, but because they are popular and can command votes , $ 

And there may be a possibility of having a President hr four 
years , distinguished neither for talents nor integrity. A Pres¬ 
ident appointed by lot, will possess the advantage, and in prac¬ 
tice it will be found a very great advantage, of coming into 
office free from party influence ; which under the present mode 
of electing, is seldom if ever to be expected; and it is to be 
feared that it will be too powerful to suffer even an honest man 
to do right. 

Ours is intended to be a Government of laws; the only kind 
of Government, under which a country can be said to be free. 

Every departure from this principle will be of dangerous tenden- 
cy; and every grant of power or discretion , the exercise of which 
is not prescribed by law, is a departure, and so far produces a 
Government of men. No matter whether this power or discre¬ 
tion be placed in the hands of one man or a small body of men, 
short of the whole Legislature, which alone perfectly repre¬ 
sents the nation. For this reason I always disliked that part 
of the Constitution which authorized the President and Sen¬ 
ate to make appointments to office; and still more the exer¬ 
cise of a power assumed by the executive of removing from 
office: a power which I can no where find given in the Con¬ 
stitution. It must be admitted, that if we are to have a Go¬ 
vernment of men , and not of laws ; and the President is to be 
entrusted with the exercise, at his discretion, of great powers 


19 


&nd prerogatives ; he ought to possess transcendent talents, 
and great integrity and firmness. But if the Legislature will 
be at the trouble of making all necessary laws, for regulating 
and managing the affairs of the nation as it is their duty to 
do; and the amendments I propose to regulate the appoint¬ 
ments to, and removals from office, shall be adopted ; there 
will be very little left to the discretion of the President; and 
without hazard to the public welfare, he may be taken by lot 
from the Senate. 

To cross the. Atlantic, in the first instance, required the ge¬ 
nius, firmness , and enterprise of a Columbus ; but with the aid 
of a compass , and charts , a man of moderate talents and in¬ 
formation, and possessing common prudence, may navigate 
the ocean in safety. To organize and put in operation a new 
’Government, requires great talents and rare accomplishments; 
but now that our Government is under way , and furnished 
with laws and well digested systems , which are the compass 
and charts of the political pilots, with these aids a number of 
men may be found in every State fully competent to take the 
helm. And after the present plan shall have been some time 
in fair operation, we may presume on having Presidents ta¬ 
ken by lot from the Senate, equal in talents and integrity, and 
superior in experience, impartiality, and regard to the public 
good, to Presidents chosen in the present mode. For it should 
be remembered, that the purpose for which Senators are ap¬ 
pointed, (which is to manage public affairs, and represent the 
State in one of the important and independent branches of the 
national council, ) will ensure practical men, who, generally 
speaking, may be more safely trusted, and more fully relied 
on for prudent and efficient management of the concerns of 
the nation, than men famed for science and abstruse learning. 
The latter will be more likely to be well acquainted with nice 
ikeories in Government, than with what is practically useful . 

Appointing a President by lot from the Senate, will give 
every State an equal and fair chance of participating in the 
dignity of that high office; will prevent the possibility of bar¬ 
gaining among the large States, to the total exclusion of the 
middling and small States; and will thus remove one ground 
of State jealousy, which must inevitably grow out of our pre¬ 
sent mode. As it regards the sovereignty of the respective 
States, the appointment by lot is in exact conformity to the 
principles of the Constitution ; for in the event of an election 
of a President by the House of Representatives, each State 
has an equal vote, conformably with its equal rights as sove¬ 
reign and independent; so that, in respect to peace and union, 
this mode of appointing a President would produce effects of 
great and lasting importance. 


20 


Being always disposed to ground my political maxims on ex¬ 
perience and fad , and not on theories, however flattering in 
their appearance, I am happy to have it in my power to say, 
that this mode of appointing important officers, by lot, where 
intrigue or undue influence was apprehended, is not novel. It 
has been practised with advantage in many republics, and par- 
ticularly in some of the republics of Switzerland ; where dvil 
liberty and equal rights were well understood and enjoyed. 
The limits of my explanatory remarks will not admit of my 
going into the subject at large, and producing the authorities ; 
which, however, should it become necessary, I will not fail 
to do on some future occasion. But I cannot forbear to men¬ 
tion the instance of a small republic in Switzerland, where a 
chief magistrate was appointed by lot, out of five candidates, * 
nominated by electors. No evil or inconvenience is stated tor 
have arisen from it; on the contrary, it was attended with many 
benefits. It checked intrigue, cabal, and undue influence, and 
tranquillized the State. One-third of the Senate is not so 
great a number of candidates for the United States, as five 
for that small republic. The greater the number , the more 
effectually does it exclude intrigue and cabal; for there would 
he little inducement to electioneer for the chance of being se¬ 
lected, by lot, as President, for one year only, out of a class 
who shall have served three years in the Senate. If such a 
mode was found salutary in a small republic, (less likely than 
a large one to be convulsed by a popular election) it must 
prove much more so in such a widely extended country as the 
United States, where the consequences to be apprehended from 
civil commotion, can better be imagined than described. 

In Berne, the largest of the republics of Switzerland, whose 
“ whole administration has been celebrated for its uncommon 
moderation, precision, and despatch,” the bailiffs, who, in their 
bailiwicks, “ represented the sovereign authority, put the laws 
in execution, acted as judges in civil and criminal cases,” and 
whose offices were lucrative, were appointed, by lot, from the 
Grand Council. The bailiffs were formerly elected; but this 
mode was abandoned on account of the undue influence which 
operated, and which ever will operate, in the election to an of¬ 
fice to which are attached great power and emolument . 

As the President is to be taken from the Senate, and, if wor¬ 
thy of the Senatorial office, must have experience, and be well 
informed of the affairs of the nation—and can also avail him¬ 
self of the information and talents of every member of the 
Government—there can be no solid objection to reducing his 
term of service to one year. The President will ahvays enter 
on his office at the close of the session of Congress; and dur- 


21 


*ng the recess will have time to make himself more fully ac¬ 
quainted with the state of the nation, so as to present a proper 
view ot it to the next Congress, as well as to conduct success¬ 
fully the public business to the end of his term. No serious 
embarrassment or inconvenience, in conducting the public bu¬ 
siness, has been felt from the change of a President or the 
head of a department. There are and always must be subor- 
r dinate officers around the Government, well acquainted with 
the routine of business; which will and must proceed in its 
usual course. If any example were necessary to show that no 
injury would arise to the nation from an annual appointment 
of a President, I might instance the ancient republic of Rome 
> —where, in the days of her greatest virtue, prosperity, and 

, glory, her chief magistrates, or consuls, were chosen every 
year. But, being taken from the Senate, a body conversant 
with the management of their public affairs, as is our Senate, 
no evil accrued to the republic. 

The office of President is the only one in our Government 
clothed with such powers as might endanger liberty; and 1 
am not without apprehension that, at some future period, they 
may be exerted to overthrow the liberties of our country. The 
change from four to ten years is small; the next step would 
' he from ten years to life, and then to the nomination of a suc¬ 

cessor ; from which the transition to an hereditary monarchy 
would almost follow of course. The exigencies of the coun¬ 
try, the public safety, and the means of defence against fo¬ 
reign invasion, may place an army in the hands of an ambi¬ 
tious, daring President, of which he would be the legitimate 
commander, and with which he might enforce his claim. This 
may not happen in my day ; it probably will not; but I have 
children whom I love, and whom I expect to leave behind, to 
share in the destinies of our common country. I cannot there¬ 
fore feel indifferent to what may befal them and generations 
yet unborn. 

I do not desire in the smallest degree to lessen the Presi¬ 
dent’s power to do good ; I only wish to place such salutary 
checks upon his power, as to prevent his doing harm. His 
power of nominating and appointing to office, and removing 
from office, will still be contiuued ; with only the additional 
check of requiring the consent of the House of Representa¬ 
tives, in one case, and of the Senate and House in the other. All 
his other powers will remain the same as at present, and there 
will be but little danger of an abuse of those powers, if the 
term of presidential office be reduced to one year, and the ap¬ 
pointment be by lot : wbich will render it impossible to bring 
the high prerogatives of this office to aid in procuring it. An 


22 


artful intriguer cannot then point to the various lucrative of¬ 
fices, in the gift of the President, for the purpose of stimulat¬ 
ing exertion in favor of his election ; than which a more pow¬ 
erful engine could not have been devised. 

Party spirit is the demon which has engendered the factions 
that have destroyed most free governments. State or local 
parties will have but a feeble influence on the General Go¬ 
vernment. Regular, organized parties only, extending from 
the northern to the southern extremity of the United States, 
and from the Atlantic to the utmost western limits ; threaten 
to shake this union to its centre . No man can be so blind but 
he must see, and the fact is too notorious to be denied, that 
such parties have commenced in this country, and are pro¬ 
gressing ith gigantic strides. The danger is great, and de¬ 
mands an early and decisive remedy. There is but one, 
which presents itself to my mind ; this is, to cut off the head 
of the demon. For without a head, without a rallying point, 
no dangerous party can be formed, no such party can exist. 
There is but a single point in the Constitution, which can be 
made to bear upon all the States at one and the same time, and 
produce a unity of interest and action , and thus serve as the 
rallying point of party ; and that is the presidential election. 
This most dignified and important office of President, made 
more desirable by having attached to it a high salary, great 
power, and extensive patronage; cannot fail to bring forth 
and array all the electioneering artillery of the country ; and 
furnish the most formidable means of organizing , concentrat¬ 
ing , and cementing parties. And when a President shall be 
elected by means of party influence, thus powerfully exerted, 
he cannot avoid party bias , and will thence become the chief 
of a party, instead of taking the dignified attitude of a Pre¬ 
sident of the United States. If some other mode of 
filling the presidential chair, than that of a general election 
throughout the United States, were devised and adopted, it 
would be impossible to form national parties. There would 
in some instances be state and local parties, but they would 
have a very inconsiderable effect on the General Government; 
they would be like town or county parties in States, which 
have a limited operation on the councils of the State. Indeed 
this presidential election does more than any thing else towards 
making parties in States—parties dangerous to their ancient 
institutions , and producing an injurious effect upon their most 
important concerns. In one word, it is now manifest, that 
the present mode of electing a President is producing, and will 
produce, many and great evils to the Union , and to the indivi¬ 
dual States . 


23 


The framers of the Constitution were, I am told, strongly 
impressed with a sense of the difficulties and dangers which 
would attend a presidential election, and hence the various 
projects which were offered , considered , and rejected. But to 
prevent a total failure of the object of their convening, they 
finally adopted the novel and complicated mode contained in 
the Constitution : calculating upon it as a mode that would 
secure a fair , unbiassed exercise of the right of suffrage. To 
guard against official and congressional influence, the elec¬ 
tors were to be chosen in each State, of whom no Member of 
Congress or officer of the United States was to be one. To 
prevent combinations among the States, there was allowed 
but a short interval between the time of their being elected 
and that of giving in their votes. To prevent cabal among 
the electors, they were to meet in their respective States, and 
give in their votes on the same day. To guard against State 
attachments, two persons were to be voted for as President, one 
of whom, at least, was not to be of the same State with them¬ 
selves. And to ensure a fair canvass of the votes, they were to 
be opened, and the election declared in the presence of both 
Houses of Congress : the person having the greatest number 
of votes, if a majority of the whole number of electors ap¬ 
pointed, to be President; and if more than one have such ma¬ 
jority, and have an equal number of votes, the House of Re¬ 
presentatives to choose by ballot, one of them for President; 
if no one have a majority, then out of the five highest, the House 
of Representatives in like manner to choose a President. In 
both cases the votes are to be taken by States, the representa¬ 
tives from each State having one vote. This mode so beauti¬ 
ful in theory , has substantially failed in practice. 

The ingenuity of man being great, is it not to be feared that 
the time will come, and would it not be cause of deep regret 
if the time should come, when the country*shall be so divided 
into parties, that a small number of persons, and those exclu¬ 
sively Members of Congress, (who are intended by the Constitu¬ 
tion to he excluded from all intermeddling in presidential elec¬ 
tions,) and that too in the very focus of presidential and official in¬ 
fluence,(which the Constitution meant carefully to guard against,) 
shall nominate a President ? And to secure his election, it will be 
required that every person before he shall receive a vote or an 
appointment as an elector, shall pledge himself to support 
such nomination ; and thus the President will in fact be made 
to choose the electors , instead of the electors choosing the Presi¬ 
dent. 

Various modes of election or appointment of a Chief Magis¬ 
trate have been tried; sometimes the choice lias been confided 


24 


to the people—sometimes to a Legislature—sometimes to a 
Senate—sometimes to electors chosen by the people, or the 
legislature—anil sometimes by electors designated by a com¬ 
plication of lot and ballot. But in no instance of the election 
of a Chief Magistrate, clothed with royal prerogatives, where 
the votes were permitted to be given directly for the candi¬ 
date, has it been possible to exclude undue influence , intrigue , 
and cabal; which have produced serious evils, and sometimes 
ended in civil war: evils so great and terrible, as to induce 
most nations to prefer an hereditary succession . 

If this mode of appointing a President by lot should not be 
approved, I see but one other shield from the calamities to be 
apprehended from a popular election of a Chief Magistrate. 
This is, to strip the office of royal prerogatives, and of all 
power excepting so much as shall enable the President to be¬ 
come the organ of the public will » in such manner as shall be 
directed by law ; to shorten the term of service, and lessen the 
salary. This will moderate the desire of obtaining the of¬ 
fice, and paralyze individual exertion. If we mean to pre¬ 
serve both our internal peace and our liberties , we must con¬ 
sent to give up the trappings , as well as the name of royalty ; 
and be content to w r ear the humjble garb of Republicans. If we 
will|not make this sacrifice—if we will have the splendor of 
royalty; must we not, like the Israelites of old, have a king ? 

The experiment of a Chief Magistrate with limited powers, 
and no discretionary prerogatives, has been successfully tried 
in some of the States, and those not inferior in respectability 
and importance to any in this Union. The chief magistracy 
is conferred by annual elections; and the Governor is little 
more than primus inter pares —the first among his equals. 
Those States have been remarkable for their uniform, steady, 
and firm adherence to their ancient institutions; and the Go¬ 
vernors of no States have displayed more energy in the exe¬ 
cution of the laws, both of the General and State Govern¬ 
ments, in aiding the prompt and impartial administration of 
justice, or in calling forth the military force for defence. In 
those States, prior to presidential elections, very little party 
animosity or divisions existed, either in relation to the elec¬ 
tion of Governor, or to the manner of executing his office. 
In these cases, the Governor not having the general power of 
nominating or appointing to, or removing from office, sudden , 
frequent and general changes of the subordinate officers of the 
State, do not take place. And can it admit of a question 
whether the public good is advanced by such changes ? Is 
there not danger that such extraordinary powers as are given 
in some Constitutions, may be abused ? Is it not possible, nay 


25 


more, is it not probable, that Chief Magistrates may be found, 
who will use their powers to aid their elections, and to reward 
such as shall be most active and zealous in promoting them ? 

Of the impropriety and impolicy of the present mode of 
electing a President, can there be stronger proof, can there 
be more convincing evidence, than is now exhibiting in the 
United States ? In whatever direction we turn our eyes, we 
behold the people arranging themselves under the banners of 
different canditates, for the purpose of commencing the elec¬ 
tioneering campaign for the next President and Vice-Presi¬ 
dent. All the passions and feelings of the human heart are 
brought into the most active operation. The electioneering 
spirit finds its way to every jire-side; pervades our domestic 
circles; and threatens to destroy the enjoyment of social har¬ 
mony. The seeds of discord will be sown in families, among 
friends, and throughout the whole community. In saying this, 
I do not mean any thing to the disadvantage of either of the 
candidates. They may have no;agency in the business; 
they may be the involuntary objects of such competition, 
without the power of directing or controlling the storm. 
The fault is in the mode of election ; in setting the people to 
choose a King. In fact, a popular election, and the exercise 
of such powers and prerogatives as are by the Constitution 
vested in the President, are incompatible. The evil is in¬ 
creasing, and will increase, until it shall terminate in civil 
war and despotism. The people suffering under the scourge 
of party feuds and factions, and finding no refuge under the 
State, any more than in the General Government, from party 
persecution and oppression; may become impatient, and sub¬ 
mit to the first tyrant, who can protect them against the thou¬ 
sand tyrants. 

1 have dwelt so long on this amendment, because of the 
novelty, in this country, of appointing a chief magistrate by 
lot. The facility of appointing by lot was obvious; but it 
seemed necessary to exhibit, and to demonstrate, the many 
arid highly important advantages, which will arise from this 
mode of appointing a President of the United States. The 
principal of these ! will now present in one short view. 

1st- It will make the Senate more respectable. 

2d. It is prompt and certain. 

3d. It will avoid the evils of a disputed election , now unpro¬ 
vided for in the Constitution. 

4th. It will exclude intrigue and cabal. 

5th. It gives talents and modest merit an equal chance. 

6th. It is economical. 

7th. It gives to the people a President of the United 
States, and not the chief of a party. 


8th. It removes temptation to use power otherwise than for 
public good . 

9th. It will annihilate a general party pervading the whole 
United States. 

1 Oth. It will remove a direct, powerful , and dangerous in¬ 
fluence of the General Government, on the individual States. 

11th. It will prevent the influence of a presidential election 
(ni our domestic concerns, and foreign relations . And 

12th. It will secure the United States against the usurpation 
of power , and every attempt, through fear, interest, or corrup- 
tioiu to sacrifice their interest, honor or independence: for one 
year is too short a time in which to contrive and execute any ex¬ 
tensive and dangerous plan of unprincipled ambition ; and the 
same person cannot be President during two successive years. 

Reducing the presidential term of service to one year, will 
remove the necessity of attaching to the office the splendor of a 
palace . The simplicity of ancient republics would better suit 
the nature of our Government. The instances of persons 
called from the plough to command armies, or to preside over 
the public councils, show, that in a republic, pomp and splen¬ 
dor are not necessary to real dignity. Cincinnatus, who was 
content with the scanty support derived from tilling, with his 
own hands, his four acre farm has been as celebrated in his¬ 
tory as the most splendid monarchs. By these remarks 1 
would not be understood to object against giving adequate 
salaries to all public functionaries. In the cases of subordi¬ 
nate officers it may be left to legislative discretion. But the 
President having such great power and extensive influence, 
his compensation ought to have a constitutional limit, and not 
exceed fifteen thousand dollars. (See Article IV.) 

Less than that perhaps, may by the legislature be judged 
sufficient. 

It will be readily seen that upon my plan the office of Vice- 
President can be no longer useful. It is therefore to be abol¬ 
ished, and provision made for choosing a speaker of the Se¬ 
nate. (See Article V.) 

The exercise of the power of appointment to office is both 
delicate and difficult. To exclude the operation of favoritism 
is important, as it regards the public good. And it is not less 
so, to secure in the various offices men of talents and integrity. 
Almost any Government, under the management of able and 
honest men, will prove a blessing ; and the best form of Go¬ 
vernment, in the hands of bad men, will be a curse to a people. 
The principle of checks applies with more force, and the neces¬ 
sity of them is as great, in relation to appointments to office, 
as in passing laws ; favoritism being more likely to have in- 


27 


tiuence in snch appointments. The next amendment, there¬ 
fore, is to provide a like security in both cases, by requiring 
the advice and consent of the Senate and House of Represen¬ 
tatives to appointments to office, where other provisions shall 
not be made by law. (See Article VI.) 

This additional check will make it somewhat more difficult 
to obtain an office; hut that will be more than countervailed 
by the additional guard which it will afford against the intro¬ 
duction of bad men. It is impossible for any President to 
know the characters of most candidates for office. The know¬ 
ledge of the Senate is also very limited, as every day’s expe¬ 
rience shows ; the Senators being obliged, individually, to 
make application to members of the other House for informa¬ 
tion. Both President and Senate are exposed to misinforma¬ 
tion. Under these circumstances, what better source of infor¬ 
mation can we have, than the representatives of the People, 
coming from every portion of the Union : they can, and when 
it is made their official duty, they will give correct informa¬ 
tion. Another circumstance which renders this amendment 
proper, is, that the President is to be taken from the Senate : 
some check, therefore, against the favoritism of the Senate 
would seem peculiarly proper. The requiring of the concur¬ 
rence of botli Senate and House of Representatives, would in¬ 
duce a greater caution, in the Executive, in making nomina¬ 
tions, and more circumspection, in the Senate, in passing upon 
them. 

Most of the observations on the preceding amendment will 
apply to the next, which I shall propose ; which is to make 
the consent of the Senate and House of Representatives neces¬ 
sary to removals from office. (See Article VII.) 

Though no express power is given, by tiie Constitution, to 
the President, to remove from office, it has been assumed and 
exercised in a manner which gives to the President almost the 
absolute power of appointment; for having the power to fill 
vacancies which take place during the recess of the Senate, 
the persons so appointed to hold their offices to the end of the 
next session of the Senate, and having exercised the power of 
making vacancies at pleasure by removal from office; no ap¬ 
pointments made by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, can continue more than one day, or while the Senate 
continue their session, if the President is pleased to exercise 
his power of removal. A tremendous power this, which will 
enable a President to remove every officer of the army, from 
the commanding general to an ensign at pleasure: to ap¬ 
point and grant commissions to his partisans to continue in 
force to the end of the next session of the Senate; to remove 


28 


all civil officers, the judges only excepted, and to make new 
appointments for the same term : thus having the absolute com¬ 
mand both of the sword and the purse , a sufficient length of 
time for an enterprising ambitious man to execute his pur¬ 
poses; especially after having had two or three years to ma¬ 
ture his plans ; and when aided by the whole civil authority, 
and military power of the country, placed in the hands of men 
devoted to his views, and subordinated to his will. Such offi¬ 
cers, having lawful commissions, issued in conformity to the 
provisions of the Constitution, could not be resisted without 
incurring the penalties of the law, and being liable to criminal 
prosecutions, and infamous punishment; which no doubt would 
be promptly executed upon them. Then would treason laws t 
sedition laws , and the whole penal code, be brought into active 
operation. 

Having these impressions, I have never been able to per¬ 
suade myself to believe, that the framers of the Constitution, 
whose great aim was to give security to our nation’s rights, 
and who have so carefully guarded all the lesser avenues to 
the temple of libety, against the unhallowed footsteps of 
usurpation and despotism ; should not only have thus left wide 
open the principal gate, but have delivered into the hands of 
such an assailant the key of the temple, and the very centinels 
placed to guard the entrance. 

Having gone through, and explained the various amend- 
mends which I propose to offer for consideration, I will close 
my observations with a few general remarks upon the dif¬ 
ferent kinds of Government, including our own. 

In a monarchy, the powers of Government are concentrated 
in one man, whose will is the supreme law . This is the most 
energetic and powerful of all Governments for military enter¬ 
prise or conquest. The whole resources of the nation being 
subject to the control of a single chief, are capable of being 
directed with the greatest energy and effect. In the hands of 
an able Prince, whose measures are directed by wisdom and 
a supreme regard for the public welfare, and whose aim is to 
promote the real prosperity and happiness of his subjects, 
(which unfortunately too seldom happens,) this kind of Go¬ 
vernment is perhaps as conducive to the tranquillity of the na¬ 
tion, as any other. But such a Government cannot be elective, 
as the experience of all ages has demonstrated. It must be 
hereditary ; and is thus liable to all the chances of a weak or 
wicked succession. And the proportion of such characters is 
too great to be risked, but in cases of inevitable necessity. In 
regard to the United States, this form of Government is out 
of the question. We have neither the materials of which to 
form such a Government, nor the disposition to introduce it. 


29 


Aristocracy is a government in the hands of nobles. Vc- 
nice, among others, exhibited an example, where the rights 
and interests of the few were preferred to those of the many . 
it was a most undesirable government. To form an aristo¬ 
cracy, privileged orders and hereditary succession are indispen¬ 
sable. The moment you limit the privilege, in its duration, 
to any term short of life, or admit the popular voice in its 
creation, by subjecting it, at regular periods, to a popular 
election ; it ceases to possess the necessary attributes of aris¬ 
tocracy. The United States do not possess the materials for 
forming an aristocracy . We have no privileged orders; nor 
should we readily consent to make a selection of men on whom 
we would confer such privileges, and agree that they should 
en joy them as a right of inheritance. It is impossible, there¬ 
fore, that an aristocracy should grow up or exist in the United 
States. We have not the means of making even an aristocra¬ 
tic branch to our government. 

A Democracy is a government wholly in the hands of the 
people: where, in their own proper persons, and not by re¬ 
presentatives, they manage their own national concerns.— 
Athens, in ancient Greece, nearly answered this description ; 
and, as long as the people preserved their virtue, it was pow¬ 
erful, prosperous, and happy. The great evil to which such 
a government is exposed, is, that, in a sudden impulse of pas¬ 
sion, or of groundless jealousy, the people are excited to some 
rash and mischievous act, which, when their passions subside, 
they review with the deepest remorse. A popular assembly, 
inflamed by artful designing men, condemned Socrates, the 
good and great, to die. After the sentence was executed, their 
passions subsided ; they repented the rash deed, and decreed 
distinguished honors to bis name. When the morals of the 
people begin to decline, “ demagogues, the greatest curse of 
free governments,” make their appearance; and, under the 
garb of patriotism and love of country , insinuate themselves 
into the confidence of the people ; procure their own elevation 
to office; and, by their machinations and intrigues, carried on 
under this specious garb, finally overturn the liberties of their 
country. Of this melancholy truth, the experience of former 
republics furnishes abundant proofs—and these ought to serve 
as a beacon to our country. The people can have no possible 
interest in supporting such men: but, led into a blind confi¬ 
dence in them by their professions of patriotism, are made the 
instruments of their own destruction. In ancient republics, 
the wisest and most virtuous of their citizens were sometimes 
excluded from office, banished, and even put to death. When 
a citizen claims to be a n exclusive patriot, and is very officious 


30 


in proclaiming his own merit , it is time for the people to be 
alarmed. 

When the three kinds of government above described are 
united, as in the government of Great Britain, it is called a 
mixed Monarchy. There is always such a spirit of jealousy 
existing between aristocracy and democracy, and between mo¬ 
narchy and democracy, that they cannot long exist together, 
without a third balancing power. As well might a man take 
up his abode in a tiger’s den, as aristocracy with democracy, 
unless protected by the strong arm of monarchy. Neither can 
monarchy and democracy dwell together, unless the throne be 
surrounded by a powerful aristocracy. Singly, democracy is 
an over-match for either. The reason is obvious— there is the 
physical force, numbers. Whenever an attempt has been 
made to oppose either monarchy or aristocracy, singly, as a 
check on democracy, they have been found too feeble to sup¬ 
port themselves : discord has arisen ; which has generally 
terminated in the overthrow of such check ; and democracy, re¬ 
maining master of the field, and freed from all restraint or 
check, has degenerated into faction, and paved the way to des¬ 
potism —despotism of the worst kind, which has entered at 
the door of discord and civil war . It is a cause of deep regret 
that it should have been the unhappy lot of most countries 
where liberty has found an asylum, to lose it by its own ex¬ 
cess. And this will be our case, unless effectual provision be 
made to stem the torrent of party spirit and violence. 

To superficial observers, our government may seem to be 
assimilated to the mixed government before mentioned. But, 
as the materials necessary to compose such a government do 
not and cannot exist among us, whatever attributes of power 
appropriate to those deficient materials, are introduced into 
our constitution, ought to be taken away ; for in practice they 
are found only to bring evils, unmixed with benefits. Ours is 
a free representative republic , deriving all power from the peo¬ 
ple ; and, when amended as I propose, for the purpose of 
checking party spirit, executive influence , and favoritism , will 
correctly express the jmblic opinion , and declare the public 
will. The people being numerous, and spread over a large 
extent of territory, cannot meet together and personally ma¬ 
nage the public concerns ; and arc therefore obliged to elect a 
few individuals to represent them in public councils, and con¬ 
fide to them the management of their public affairs. Every 
branch of our government being elective , rests on the public 
will. And, could the people be left to a fair, uninfluenced ex¬ 
ercise of their right of suffrage, and our public councils be 
guided in their deliberations and decisions by an honest zeal 


31 


for (he public good, regardless of personal views of elevation 
to or continuance in office; ours would be the best and happi¬ 
est government that does or ever did exist. 

That I may not be misunderstood, I do most expressly de¬ 
clare, that, in a free government, such as is that of the United 
States, deriving its power wholly from the people, I do consi¬ 
der checks to be necessary ; nay, more, to be indispensable. 
Without them, the government could not long exist, but would 
he like a ship under full sail, in a brisk wind, without ballast. 
But the checks must comport with the principles of a popular 
government ; which, excluding all hereditary distinctions, 
must depend for its support on a proper distribution of power. 
Those principles require, what experience has demonstrated to 
be correct, that, as those who exercise the powers of govern¬ 
ment arc individually equal in their rights , and alike derive 
their authorities, directly or indirectly, from the people : they 
be divided, whenever they are assembled, into several branches, 
or departments, each, when acting on the same measure, hav¬ 
ing a check on the other. Thus, in the legislature, the two 
houses must each have an absolute negative on the doings of 
the other ; and the executive a qualified negative on both. In 
this there is security, that every subject will be discussed and 
decided on in the tw r o houses separately . This will tend to ar¬ 
rest hasty measures, and prevent favoritism: for, upon the 
plan proposed, it would be rare indeed if an excitement of pas¬ 
sion ,, or a sudden impulse of feeling, should operate, at the same 
moment, in the three departments, to induce the adoption of an 
improper measure; or that a candidate for office should have 
such good fortune as to secure the concurrence of all three to 
his appointment, on the ground of mere favoritism. 

The different branches of the government, from a regard to 
their own privileges and character, and influenced each by that 
esprit du corps and self-respect which political bodies naturally 
possess, will feel a pride in correcting the errors and mistakes 
of the other. An act, after it has passed both houses, must be 
considered and decided upon by the executive, who, if he dis¬ 
approves, is to return it, accompanied with his reasons for 
such dissent. Then it is to undergo a revision ; and cannot 
take effect but by a concurrence of two-thirds of each branch, 
under the high responsibility of having the measure entered 
at large on the public journals, with the reasons against its 
adoption, together with the name and vote of each member— 
who thereby pledges bimself for its policy and correctness. 
Under these checks, it would be strange, indeed, if a measure, 
manifestly ruinous in its consequences, or very injurious to the 
nation, should not be arrested in its progress; if, however, it 


.52 


should unfortunately be otherwise, frequent elections, and the 
short duration of the term of office, will put it in the power of 
the nation to correct the evil . Improper acts sometimess pass 
through inattention, or misapprehension of their tendency— 
this is to be expected ; it is incident to human frailty. 

It having been shown that a long term of service does not 
tend to produce an independent course of conduct, but the con¬ 
trary ; the term of service ought to conform to the convenient 
and beneficial organization of the government. One year for 
the house will bring every session of Congress to succeed a 
new election ; one-third of the Senators will also have been 
newly elected. Two-thirds of the Senate remaining, they can 
check a ruinous measure brought forward by the House of Re¬ 
presentatives, chosen under any sudden impulse, which for a 
moment might agitate the nation, and under the influence of 
which the election may have been made, until the people shall 
'nave had one year to consider, and a new election .shall have 
taken place: when, if the measure be still persisted in, it may 
be considered as a fair expression of the public will,and ought 
to pass. Any attempt to add a further check or restraint 
would be useless, perhaps injurious; as it might lead the peo¬ 
ple to such an exertion of power to overcome such restraint, 
as might make a breach in the Constitution. 

In the opinions of men respecting liberty and free govern¬ 
ment. there are two extremes to which we are exposed, which 
are the Scylla and Charybdis of such governments, and which 
ought carefully to be shunned, as the inclination to one or the 
other exposes to shipwreck. On one hand, too great an ap¬ 
prehension of danger from popular instability and violence 
may excite a wish to increase the energies of the government 
to eoc.cess . This, instead of insuring personal safety, and giv¬ 
ing stability and security to our systems, tend to excite jealou¬ 
sy and fears among the people, and to impel them to exertions 
of power often injurious, and sometimes dangerous. On the 
other hand, apprehensions of mighty evils from too much ener¬ 
gy in government, have produced the opposite extreme, and 
have led many to attempt to take away all restraint on thepo- 
pular will, and induced a wish to place the supreme legislative 
and executive power in the hands of a single body, cbosen un¬ 
der the greatest possible popular feeling ; excluding altogether 
the benefits of those checks which secure deliberation. A di¬ 
vision of the same men into two branches, deliberating sepa¬ 
rately, i and rendered independent of each other, by a negative 
reciprocally absolute, would conduce to consideration, and a 
prudent result; and afford a great security against rash in¬ 
temperate acts. 


as 


Another rock, which presents danger, and on which liberty 
has most generally been shipwrecked, is party spirit . When¬ 
ever a free people become so divided into parties, as, that all 
elections and appointments to office become a struggle between 
the ins and the outs ; liberty is in danger, the public good is 
lost sight of. and the government degenerates into a faction, 
which is made subservient to the most oppressive party perse¬ 
cutions, and is subject to continual fluctuation and change. At 
such times, modest merit retires from public employment, and 
the affairs of the nation fall into the hands of men, whose sole 
recommendations are zeal and violence. As the ins have no¬ 
thing to give, and the outs will have the public offices at their 
disposal, on the event of a successful election, the government 
will be continually vibrating between parties. What possible 
interest can the great body of the people have in such a state 
of things ? Are the interests, peace, and happiness, of the 
many , to be sacrificed to the few ? Are the people’s rights no¬ 
thing, and the claims of a few individuals to office every thing? 
And who are these few ? They are office-hunters, and ambi¬ 
tious men, who, not content to walk in the paths of private 
life, aim only at their own elevation ; men who profess to love 
the people , in order to mount on their shoulders to power and 
wealth. It may be asked, why is it thus ? I answer, that 
such men, regardless of the real interest, always address them¬ 
selves to the passions of the people, which lock up their under¬ 
standings and judgments close prisoners. 

The only effectual way of remedying these evils, is, to re¬ 
move the causes. This may be done by returning the repre¬ 
sentatives, by frequent elections, to the people ; by shortening 
the terms of service of the President and Senate; by reducing 
the salary of the President ; by avoiding, as much as possible, 
the accumulation of power in the hands of an individual, or a 
small body of men ; and, above all, by constituting such a 
mode of obtaining a chief magistrate as shall not be made the 
instrument of arraying the people, from one end to the other 
of this extended empire, into parties, under different chiefs, 
the candidates for the presidential chair. 

The organization of the General and State Governments ex¬ 
hibits the most remarkable combination of checks and balances 
of individual and State security ever known. The General 
Government, as it regards the nation, has a sovereign and con¬ 
trolling power over the seventeen State Governments; while 
each of these, independent and sovereign for all local and State 
purposes, depends on, and is connected with the General Go¬ 
vernment by the strong attraction of its national interests. 
The General Government, like the sun in the solar system, is 
S 


34 


the centre of attraction, and the bond of union; and its pro 
visions for the common defence and general welfare , like the 
rays of the sun, give life and activity to the nation. As the 
planets, in their revolutions around the sun, have their distinct 
spheres of attraction and control; so the States, separately, 
possess complete sovereignty, each within its own jurisdiction 
and limits, extending to its citizens protection to life, liberty* 
and property. How much is it to be lamented, that a system, 
so beautiful in theory, and so beneficial in practice, should be 
disturbed by that fiend, party spirit—that prince of the power 
of the air , who can invade every sphere—that demon , who can 
pass the bounds of every State, and, by sowing discord and di¬ 
visions, destroy social harmony , overturn the most valuable in¬ 
stitutions, and endanger the liberties of our country . 

I have been obliged, for the purpose of explaining the prac¬ 
ticability and operation of the amendments, and of proving 
and illustrating their utility, to take a considerable range; 
though they are simple, few in number , and easily made; and, 
when made, will leave the other provisions of the constitution 
unimpaired, and in their fair, full, and perfect operation. They 
may be comprised under four heads : 

1st—As to the Legislative body, to shorten the term of ser¬ 
vice of the Representatives from two years, to one , and 
of the Senators from six years, to three, 

2d—As to the Executive, to shorten the term of office of the 
President, from four years, to one , reduce his salary, 
and alter the mode of his appointment. 

3d—To abolish the office of Vice President. 

4th—To place an additional check on the President’s power 
of appointing to and removing from office. 

I shall be asked, whether, at a time when we are threatened 
with danger from abroad, and have party dissensions at home, 
is it not an inauspicious season for bringing forward amend¬ 
ments to the constitution ? Why I have been so long silent, 
and have not before presented this all-important subject to the 
view of Congress and the nation ? These are questions which 
I have well considered, and I have fully satisfied myself that 
now is the proper time , and probably the only time, to engage 
attention. In times of perfect tranquillity every man is occu¬ 
pied w ith his farm, his merchandise, and other objects by which 
he may acquire subsistence, wealth, and honest fame. Seeing 
no immediate danger, he gives himself no concern about the 
constitution. The time of danger is the only time when pub¬ 
lic attention can be universally excited. 

The constitution, in those parts which 1 propose to change, 
appeared so beautiful in theory, that no attempt to alter it 


35 


would have attracted the smallest notice, until, by experiment, 
it should be found to be ineffectual for the purpose intended— 
a fair election of a President and a beneficial exercise of the 
powers and provisions of the constitution. The experiment has 
been made, and many of the people of the United States are 
now satisfied that amendments are necessary, are indispensa¬ 
ble; and this is perhaps the first moment when 1 could have 
gained an audience to such amendments as I think necessary, 
and such as alone can effect a radical cure. 

From the circumstances of the time, may I not hope for their 
adoption ? Is there not reason to fear, that, if we sail on a 
little longer in the stream of party , the current will set so 
1 strongly, that we cannot return ; but must descend a cataract , 

which will dash in pieces our national ship ? 

The importance of the subject will furnish my apology, for 
having taken up so much of the time of the Senate, in expla¬ 
natory remarks. The sentiments I have expressed have not 
been hastily adopted ; they are not the sudden impulse of the 
moment ; nor do they proceed from the collision of party. 
They are the sober sentiments of my heart; some of which I 
have long entertained, and often expressed to my most intimate 
and confidential friends. And they are sentiments which se¬ 
venteen years’ experience, as a member of the Senate and 
House of Representatives, under this constitution, has served 
to impress and enforce on my mind ; and, during that whole 
period, there has not occurred one solitary fact to disprove 
their correctness. 

May I be permitted, in this hour of alarm, when almost the 
whole civilized world is engaged in a destructive and exter¬ 
minating war, when thick clouds hang lowering over our heads, 
and danger surrounds us on every side, to invoke patriotism— 
to call to our aid love of country— to enable us to make a wil¬ 
ling sacrifice, on the altar of the public welfare, of all local and 
party feelings, of all groundless jealousy, and of whatever can 
excite and keep alive divisions among us. Let us unite in pro¬ 
viding for the public defence. Let us candidly come forward 
and repair any breach which may have been made in the Con¬ 
stitution, the fortress of our safety and union; and carefully 
search out and correct such errors, and supply such defects, as 
it shall be found to contain : not in a manner to promote any 
particular or favorite object; but so as to add to its strength 
and durability , that it may secure to unborn millions the bless - 
ings of peace and good government , and fix on a solid basis 
their liberty and independence. 


\ 


IN SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
April 12, 1808. 


Mr. Hlllhouse submitted the following Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States, for consideration : 

Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America, in Congress assembled, two thirds of 
of both Houses concurring, That the following articles be pro¬ 
posed to the Legislatures of the several States, as amendments 
to the Constitution of the United States ; all or any of which 
articles, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, 
to be valid to all intents and purposes, as part of the said Con¬ 
stitution, viz : 

Articles in addition to, and amendment of the Constitution of the 
United States of America, proposed by Congress, and ratified 
by the Legislatures of the several States pursuant to the fifth 
article of the original Constitution . 

ARTICLE I. 

After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen, the House of Representatives shall he composed 
of members chosen every year by the People of the several 
States : their Electors in each State shall have the qualifica¬ 
tions requisite for Electors of the most numerous branch of the 
State Legislature : and their term of service shall expire on 
the first Tuesday of April in each year. 

ARTICLE II. 

After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen, the Senators of the United States shall he chosen 
for three years ; and their term of service shall expire on the 
first Tuesday of April. 

Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of 
the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be, 
into three classes. The seats of the first class shall be vacated 
at the expiration of the first year, of the second class at the 
expiration of the second year, and of the third class at the 



38 


expiration of the third year, so that one third may be chosen 
every year. Vacancies to be filled as already provided. 

article hi. 

On the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen, the President of the United States shall be ap¬ 
pointed, and shall hold his office until the expiration of the 
first Tuesday of April, one thousand eight hundred and four¬ 
teen. And on the first Tuesday of April, one thousand eight 
hundred and fourteen, and on the first Tuesday of April in 
each succeeding year, the President shall be appointed to 
hold his office during the term of one year. The mode of 
appointment shall be as follows : 

In presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, 
each Senator belonging to the class whose term of ser¬ 
vice will first expire, and constitutionally eligible to the office 
of President, of which the House of Representatives shall be 
the sole judges, and shall decide without debate, shall, begin¬ 
ning with the first on the alphabet, and in their alphabetical 
order, draw a ball out of a box, containing the same number 
of uniform balls as there shall be Senators present and eligible, 
one of which balls shall be colored, the others white. The 
Senator who shall draw the colored ball shall be President. 
A committee of the House of Representatives, to consist of 
a member from each State, to be appointed in such a manner 
as the House shall direct, shall place the balls in the box, shall 
shake the same so as to intermix them, and shall superintend 
the drawing thereof. 

In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his 
death, resignation or inability to discharge the powers and du¬ 
ties thereof, if Congress be then in session, or if not, as soon 
as they shall be in session, the President shall, in the manner 
before mentioned, be appointed for the residue of the term. 
And until the disability be removed, or a President be appoint¬ 
ed, the Speaker of the Senate shall act as President. And 
Congress may, by law, provide for the case of removal by 
death, resignation or inability of the President, and vacancy 
in the office, or inability of the Speaker of the Senate ; and 
such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability of the 
President be removed, or another be appointed. 

The seat of a Senator who shall be appointed as President, 
shall thereby be vacated. 

ARTICLE IV. 

After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen, the compensation of the President shall not ex¬ 
ceed fifteen thousand dollars a year. 


39 


ARTICLE V. 

After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen, the office of Vice-President shall cease. And the 
Senate, on the same day in each year, when the President 
shall be annually appointed, shall choose a Speaker ; and in 
the absence of the Speaker, or when he shall exercise the of¬ 
fice of President, the Senate shall choose a Speaker pro tem¬ 
pore . 


ARTICLE VI. 

After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred 
and thirteen, the President shall nominate, and by and with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, and of the House of Re¬ 
presentatives, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Minis¬ 
ters and Consuls, Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other 
officers of the United States whose appointments are not here¬ 
in otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by 
law. But Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of 
such officers as they think proper, in the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate ; and of the inferior 
officers in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments. But no law vesting the power of ap¬ 
pointment shall be for a longer term than two years. All pro¬ 
ceedings on nominations shall be with closed doors, and with¬ 
out debate; but information of the character and qualifica¬ 
tions of the person nominated shall be received. 

ARTICLE VII. 

After the third day of March, one thousand eight hundred 
arid thirteen, the President shall have power to fill all vacan¬ 
cies that may happen during the recess of Congress, by grant¬ 
ing commissions which shall expire at the end of their next 
session. No removal from office shall take place without the 
consent of the Senate and of the House of Representatives. But 
Congress may, by law 7 , authorize the removal by the same 
power, as may, by law, be authorized to make the appoint 
ment. But in every case of misconduct in office, where the 
consent of the Senate, or of the Senate and House of Repre¬ 
sentatives, shall be necessary to a removal, the President, du¬ 
ring the recess of Congress, may suspend the officer, and 
make a temporary appointment of a person to exercise the of¬ 
fice, until the next meeting of Congress, and until a decision 
can be had by the Senate, or by the Senate and House of Re- 


presentatives, as the case may be, on a question for the remo- 
val of the officer suspended. All proceedings respecting re¬ 
moval from office shall be had, without debate, upon the infor¬ 
mation and reasons which shall be communicated by the Pre¬ 
sident, and with closed doors. 


In Senate United States, 
April 14, 1808. 

A true copy of the original on file. 

Attest, 


SAM. A. OTIS, Sec'y* 



















































































































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